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ARTICLE
Less Human, More Ourselves: Michel 
Houellebecq’s Neohumans and the 
Anthropocene Subject
Patricia Malone
Queen’s University Belfast, GB
pmalone05@qub.ac.uk
This essay explores the way in which Michel Houellebecq’s literary  depictions 
of a genetically modified ‘human’ race, described as ‘neohumans’, articulate 
the distress of the Anthropocene subject and explore the evolution of 
subjectivity in a techno-natural context. Considering Houellebecq’s work 
in an ecocritical context, this essay seeks to expand current readings of 
the author in order to illuminate the implications of his vision of the self-
reflexive Anthropocene subject. It seeks to explore how creation myths 
evolve in the Anthropocene era and what it means for humans to act 
on themselves in this context. This also opens up questions around the 
framing of our current epoch as ‘Anthropocene’, and seeks to examine, 
through Houellebecq’s account, the pessimism of this understanding, and 
the myth of human exceptionalism that underpins it. Focusing on  Atomised 
(2000) and The Possibility of an Island (2006), I seek to illuminate 
 Houellebecq’s gestures towards an Anthropocene sensibility, and to assess 
his accounts of self-negation at subject and species level with regard to 
the concept of ‘shadowtime, defined as ‘the sense of living in two or more 
orders of temporal scale simultaneously’. Further, it seeks to question the 
role of literature in addressing these concerns, positing the emergence of 
a contemporary literature of ‘futurised presents’ (J. G. Ballard’s ‘next five 
minutes’), of which Houellebecq’s work is part.
Keywords: Anthropocene; neohuman; ecocriticism; Houellebecq;  speculative 
fiction
Extending Ecocriticism: Bridging the ‘Authenticity Gap’
In 2003, France was hit by its worst heat wave since 1500 (Pomadère et al, 2005). 
Nearly 15,000 deaths were linked to the heat wave, many of them amongst 
the elderly population. Michel Houellebecq’s 2005 novel, The Possibility of an 
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Island, incorporated and extended this ‘natural’ disaster in a brief aside in the 
narrative:
Like every year now, summer was scorching in France, and like every year the 
old died en masse, owing to lack of care, in their hospitals and  retirement 
homes; but people had long since stopped feeling indignant about this, it 
had become in some way passed into tradition, as though it were a  natural 
means of solving the statistical problem of an increasingly ageing  population 
that was necessarily prejudicial to the economic stability of the country. 
(2005: 303–4)
In this short comment, Houellebecq illustrates his awareness of the  anthropogenic 
climate change that has occasioned the reclassification of our geologic era as 
‘ Anthropocene’ (Steffen et al, 2007). He comments on the mode of adaptation 
employed by the population at large: a reframing of ‘nature’ to incorporate  occurrences 
that are neither natural nor inevitable. People accept this as though it were a natural 
means of solving a population crisis, although both climate change and increased life 
expectancy are a result of anthropogenic activity (McMichael, 2014). Further to this, 
Houellebecq situates the rationale for this acceptance as rooted in economic logic: 
the problem of overpopulation is ‘statistical’, and threatens ‘economic  stability’. This 
language echoes the way in which the rhetoric of neoliberal governance  bureaucratises 
human life, and euphemises its unpalatable realities through  rephrasing them in 
the abstract language of the market – processes of ‘abstraction and categorisation’ 
(Hibou, 2015). The passage also references the individualisation (or ‘atomisation’, in 
Houellebecq’s terminology) of life under neoliberalism; the elderly die in institutions, 
already removed from their homes and separate from families who, it seems, have 
become detached, ceasing to care about this phenomenon. This depiction matches 
the reality of the 2003 heat wave: Pomadère et al report that in two thirds of deaths 
in Paris and the surrounding areas, the deceased was resident in an institution, rather 
than a private home (2005: 1486–7).
In beginning with this passage, I am seeking to demonstrate the way in 
which awareness of the Anthropocene permeates Houellebecq’s work, in both 
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‘environmental’ and ‘human’ terms, although this is, evidently, a somewhat  spurious 
distinction. Houellebecq’s work has long been noted for its exploration of the 
neoliberalisation of sexual relationships: that is, the extension of the market into 
the ‘private’ realm of everyday life. Hence the title of his first novel, Extension du 
domaine de la lutte (1994), which translates as ‘the extension of the domain of the 
struggle’ (published in English as Whatever in 1998). In his follow up, Atomised 
(2000), Houellebecq extended his own philosophical domain beyond humanity. The 
novel tells the story of Michel Djerzinski, a molecular biologist who discovers a way 
to copy any cell perfectly, and thus makes cloning – and ‘immortality’ – possible. 
This narrative is framed by an unspecified neohuman voice, reflecting on Djerzinski’s 
life and work from some future time where humanity has more or less chosen to 
facilitate its own extinction, in favour of the ‘more perfect’ neohumans. This theme 
of the novel is revisited in The Possibility of an Island (2005), which offers an 
 extensive account of neohumanity, interweaving the narrative of a contemporary 
human (Daniel, known also as Daniel1) with that of two of his ‘successors’, as the 
 neohuman clones refer to themselves. Although The Possibility of an Island also 
features a biotechnologist (Miskiewicz, given the nickname ‘Knowall’ for his  tendency 
to subsume all life into scientific rational discourse), its protagonist is actually a 
comedian – Daniel is a middle aged Frenchman who becomes entangled with a New 
Age sect called the Elohimites, modelled on the Raëlians, a real world UFO sect.
Previously, this strand of Houellebecq’s work has generally been read as 
 posthumanist (Morrey, 2013) or dystopian, albeit in a loosely anthropogenic  context 
(Ginn, 2015). I am seeking to extend these readings to situate Houellebecq’s work in 
an ecocritical context. Both novels offer critical reflection on contemporary networks 
of biopower, and on the way in which human desire has been the engine of 
 anthropogenic change. This accords with Greg Garrard’s account of the  function of 
ecocriticism at the present time, which emphasises the prevalence of Foucauldian 
approaches within the discipline, resulting in ‘the historicization of ecology and 
the ecologization of history’ (2014: 3; emphasis in original), and with Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s description of the ‘energy-intensive’ form of human freedoms 
since the Enlightenment (2009: 208). I am also responding to theorists such as 
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Richard Kerridge, Astrid Bracke and Nicole Seymour. Bracke and Kerridge make 
 convincing calls for the expansion of ecocritical practice, seeking to broaden the 
remit of  ecocritical reading beyond work directly situated in, or thematically 
 concerned with, ‘pure’ nature. Bracke advocates an expansive ‘urban ecocriticism’, 
recuperating readings of the contemporary novel and other forms that do not 
necessarily take ‘nature’ as their primary theme or setting (2014). This approach, 
it seems to me, offers a more fruitful way to recognise the collapse between the 
cultural and the natural, and to offer readings that conceive of a ‘social’  ecocriticism. 
In a similar vein, Kerridge asks the reader to attend to the function of work,  something 
like its ‘activist potential’ (2014: 362–63; 372–75). 
Nicole Seymour also seeks to move away from any prescriptive understanding of 
ecocriticism, and asks us to consider the utility of an ‘irreverent ecocriticism’: ‘instead 
of remaining serious in the face of self-doubt, ridicule, and broader  ecological crisis, 
we [should] embrace our sense of our own absurdity, our uncertainty, our humour, 
even our perversity’ (2012: 57). Although Houellebecq is often read as pessimistic or 
depressive, his work delights in absurdity – from the philosophical dialogues between 
animals authored by the unnamed protagonist of Whatever to the comedic stylings of 
Daniel in The Possibility of an Island, whose shows include ‘We Prefer the Palestinian 
Orgy Sluts’ and ‘Let’s Drop Miniskirts on Palestine!’ (2005: 35). Uncertainty about the 
future on both a personal and planetary level motivates the speculative form of his 
novels, and humour and perversity abound in his work too. This can be seen in the 
epilogue of The Possibility of an Island, when neohuman Daniel25 presents us with a 
deadpan critique of environmentalism:
The last centuries of human civilization, it is a little known but significant 
fact, had seen the appearance in western Europe of movements inspired by 
a strangely masochistic ideology, known as ‘ecologicism’, although it bore 
little relation to the science of that name. These movements emphasised the 
necessity of protecting ‘nature’ from human activity, and pleaded for the idea 
that all species, whatever their degree of development, had an equal ‘right’ 
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to occupy the planet; some followers of these movements even seemed to 
systematically take the side of the animals against men, to feel more sorrow 
at the news of a disappearance of a species of invertebrates than at that  
of a famine ravaging the population of a continent. … my first neohuman 
predecessors, such as Daniel13 and Daniel14, emphasise the sense of  
slight irony with which they watch dense forests, populated by wolves and 
bears, spreading rapidly over the old industrial complexes. (Houellebecq, 
2005: 396)
Houellebecq uses the neohuman narrator here to give vent to the very frustrations 
Seymour suggests ecocritics face. As she writes, 
My students often ask me if I think there’s hope for the future of the planet. 
I tell them I think it’s probably going to hell in a handbasket, and all of us 
with it. And then I laugh.
I laugh in part – I must confess – because it’s hilarious to see so many 
faces, brimming with expectant hopefulness, droop into despondency. I 
can’t help myself. But I’m also laughing at myself – at the absurdity of my 
position, as a person who writes and teaches about environmental ethics 
and the connectivity of the human and the non-human but is unsure if, in 
the end, any of that work matters. (2012: 56)
Both Atomised and The Possibility of an Island work in the space Seymour  identifies 
as the ‘authenticity gap’ between knowledge and behaviour, to paraphrase Kerridge’s 
reading (Kerridge, 2014: 364). This ‘gap’ is the space between our knowledge of the 
probability of environmental disaster, and our suppression – which amounts to 
refusal – of the reality of this knowledge: ‘our knowledge and our behavior cannot 
both be authentic, can they?’ (Kerridge, 2014: 364). This gap is ridiculous, absurd – 
and real. 
One reason for this gap, as suggested by Chakrabarty and explored in 
Houellebecq’s work, is the disjuncture between individual consciousness and 
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self-awareness at species level. It is the latter, it seems, which is required in order to 
‘fill in’ our authenticity gap. Chakrabarty asks:
Who is the we? We humans never experience ourselves as a species. We can 
only intellectually comprehend or infer the existence of the human species 
but never experience it as such. There could be no phenomenology of us as 
a species. Even if we were to emotionally identify with a word like mankind, 
we would not know what being a species is, for, in species history, humans 
are only an instance of the concept species as indeed would be any other life 
form. But one never experiences being a concept. (2009: 220)
In Atomised and The Possibility of an Island, Houellebecq explores this  question,  seeking 
to probe both the limitations and the possibilities of ‘Anthropocene  subjectivity’. In 
writing neohuman narratives, Houellebecq adopts a strategy that goes some way to 
bridging the authenticity gap, offering a vision of a ‘world without us’ in the style of 
Alan Weisman’s powerful thought experiment (Weisman, 2007). Where Weisman’s 
exercise imagines the sudden disappearance of humans from the face of the earth, 
Houellebecq’s work mediates the ontological shock of  non-existence through these 
‘intermediary’ figures – the neohumans – and the destabilised temporal space of 
their layered and indeterminate narratives, which enact a reflexive commentary on 
human life from an inhuman perspective, rendering meaning partial and provisional. 
(Re)Creating Our Selves: Neohuman Creation Myths
As mentioned earlier, the narrative of Atomised is framed by an unspecified 
 neohuman speaker (or collective of speakers, as befits a post-individual society). We 
are told at the opening that ‘This book is principally the story of a man who lived 
out the greater part of his life in Western Europe, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century’ (Houellebecq, 2000: 3). The specificity of this account – focused on one 
man, one place, one time – stands in contrast to the vastness of the biblical creation 
myth. In Genesis, God creates the heaven and the earth: light, dark, night, day, sky, 
land, sea. Atomised begins with (a) man – a biologist – who disappears before us even 
as we are introduced to him: ‘At the time of his disappearance, Michel Djerzinski was 
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unanimously considered to be a first-rate biologist and a serious contender for the 
Nobel prize’ (Houellebecq, 2000: 3). Djerzinski is the intellectual originator of this 
new life, and of the rift between the human and the neohuman. Of biotechnologists, 
Bill McKibben writes, ‘It is the simple act of creating new forms of life that changed 
the world – that puts us forever in the deity business. We will never again be a  created 
being; instead we will be creators’ (1990: 154). Djerinski is not worshipped, however. 
The idea of god-like creator is, in this account, a manmade myth. Once man is gone, 
there is no need for any mystical origin story. And while this book is framed as a 
 tribute to mankind, it is not an elegy, for the neohumans cannot lament the passing 
of a species they perceive as vile and unhappy (Houellebecq, 2000: 379). 
The Possibility of an Island confronts the reader with a beginning before the 
beginning: the novel opens with an unmarked prologue comprising a direct address 
from Houellebecq to the reader, a biblical interjection of sorts – ‘Who, among you, 
deserves eternal life?’ (2005: 2) – and a message to readers from an as yet unknown 
neohuman narrator. This layering continues throughout the novel, with the primary 
narrative of Daniel1 woven through with commentary from Daniels 24 and 25. 
These ‘books of Daniel’ are true to the apocalyptic content of the biblical Book of 
Daniel, although the apocalypse in The Possibility of an Island is figured in terms of 
ecological disaster:
The melting of the ice occurred at the First Decrease, and reduced the 
 population of the planet from fourteen billion to seven hundred million. 
The Second Decrease was more gradual; it happened throughout the 
whole of the Great Drying Up, and continues to this day.
The Third Decrease will be definitive; it is yet to come. (Houellebecq, 
2005: 95) 
Rather than acts of God, these disasters are distinctly manmade. We learn later that 
the First Decrease was the result of the detonation of thermonuclear bombs at 
the North and South poles, resulting in the melting of the ice caps (Houellebecq, 
2005: 389). The neohumans, according to Daniel25, see destruction as the innate 
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destiny of the human race, based on their – our – violent nature, and inability to 
see the imminent outcome of their – our – behaviour (the authenticity gap, again): 
A violent, savage future was what awaited men; many were aware of it even 
before the unleashing of the first troubles . . .This anticipatory  awareness, 
however, did not enable men in any way to put into action, or even to 
 imagine any kind of solution. (Houellebecq, 2005: 390) 
In Atomised, the eradication of the human race is more banal than this. Following 
the introduction of the neohuman species, who in this novel have been designed 
to experience extreme sensory pleasure without the biological necessity of sex, 
human reproductive rates start to fall. By the close of the novel, extinction is all but 
 inevitable: ‘Contrary to the doomsayers, this extinction is taking place peaceably, 
despite occasional acts of violence which will continue to decline. It has been 
 surprising to note the meekness, the resignation, perhaps even the relief of humans 
at their own passing away’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 378).
In The Possibility of an Island, neohumans have evolved a religion of their own. 
Based on the teachings of the ‘Supreme Sister’, and organised around the negation 
of any desire that seems ‘human’, this religion has three pillars of faith: ‘the rigorous 
duplication of the genetic code, meditation on the life story of the predecessor, the 
writing of the commentary’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 154). The neohumans of this novel 
are not the perfect race of Atomised. There are frequent references to their 
 intermediary state, and their vaguely millenarian religion sees them awaiting the 
coming of the ‘Future Ones’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 142, 154, 414). The religion of the 
Supreme Sister promotes a Buddhist self-negation that aligns with Schopenhauer’s 
teachings, with the aim that individual behaviour should be ‘as predictable as the 
functioning of a refrigerator’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 393). Indeed, the first text of 
this religion is based on the appliance for a kitchen manual. This Schopenhauerian 
framework informs Atomised too, where the ‘perfection’ of neohumans stems from 
negation of desire: ‘it is certainly true that we have succeeded in overcoming the 
monstrous egotism, cruelty and anger which they could not . . . without the stimulus 
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of personal vanity, the pursuit of Truth and Beauty has taken on a less urgent aspect’ 
(Houellebecq, 2000: 378–79; ellipsis added). In an ecocritical context, we can 
 consider this as an injunction to find a way to reframe our relationship with the earth 
so that ‘our desires are not the engine’ (McKibben, 1990: 176). 
Daniel 25 says, ‘According to the Supreme Sister, jealousy, desire and the appetite 
for procreation share the same origin, which is the suffering of being’ (Houellebecq, 
2005: 326). Overcoming these desires will allow neohumans to ‘reach the state 
where the simple fact of being constitutes in itself a permanent occasion for joy’ 
(Houellebecq, 2005: 326). This ‘simple fact of being’ is that fact of being in the world, 
which is to say, forming a relationship with the world not based on  destructive and 
distorting anthropogenic systems. The hidden intention in reviewing these life stories 
is to move beyond self-negation towards a Nietzschean affirmation that recognises 
the unity of the world, recast in an Anthropocene context: ‘If we affirm one single 
moment, we thus affirm not ourselves but all existence’ (Nietzsche, 1968: 532). This 
echoes ecologist Julianne Warren’s insistence that we must find a positive generative 
way for humans to interact with the natural world, to become life enhancing, rather 
than life ruining (2015). Houellebecq’s work suggests that the enmity felt by man 
towards nature is a manifestation of anger at the finite span of human life in 
 comparison to the perceived ‘eternity’ of nature – the same anger or fear that drives 
us to conceive of immortal life in the religious sense. We see this when Elohimite 
leader Vincent says ‘We have discovered immortality, and presence in the world; the 
world no longer has the power to destroy us, it is we, rather, who have the power 
to create through the power of our vision’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 359). This is deeply 
ironic; in geological terms, the ‘immortality’ of humans occurs through their 
 unprecedented impact on the world through the institution of their  anthropogenic 
vision. In The Possibility of an Island, a generative relationship with the world eludes 
neohuman Daniel25 because he cannot overcome his own sense of  impermanence. 
Despite the genetic immortality of the neohumans, he is still haunted by 
the  inevitability of his own corporeal decline (Houellebecq, 2005: 421). As such, 
 affirmation remains beyond him.
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Houellebecq’s deconstruction of the creation myth in the Anthropocene era 
seeks to problematise the human exceptionalism underpinning the narrative of 
 progress that has served to legitimise the rapacious exploitation of natural resources. 
Chakrabarty references Marx’s assertion that ‘men make their own history, but they 
do not make it just as they please’ (2009: 202). Similarly, Houellebecq insists that 
men make their own myths, and that it is no longer a creation myth that dominates, 
but one more like a creative destruction myth, in the vein of Schumpeter, who is 
referenced in both novels. This incessant move to innovate and replace, the ‘essential 
fact’ about capitalism (Schumpeter, 1942: 83) becomes the mechanism by which 
the human race rationalises itself out of existence. Djerzinski, and Miskiewicz, the 
engineers of neohumanity, offer a supremely rational scientific account of progress 
that appeals to a society in thrall to the ‘technical’ solution. In Atomised, this is 
 associated with the decline of ‘human sciences’ following a fall from grace by  cultural 
critics such as Lacan, Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze – a warning note, perhaps, in the 
neoliberal war against humanities in the academy (Houellebecq, 2000: 376). In The 
Possibility of an Island, Daniel1 recounts how, during an Elohimite retreat, Miskiewicz 
offers a lecture in which he uses a container full of fluids to represent the chemical 
composition of a human being. The scientist claims that ‘The human being is matter 
plus information’, where this ‘information’ is not personality or knowledge, but DNA 
(Houellebecq, 2005: 207). This echoes McKibben’s account of the biotechnologist 
once again:
The biotechnologist looks at organisms not as ‘discrete entities’, but as a set 
of instructions on the computer program that is DNA. It is impossible to 
have respect for a set of instructions: they can always be rewritten. And in 
the view of the researchers they should be rewritten – ever improved until 
they meet some state of absolute efficiency. (McKibben, 1990: 155)
In the account of transition between humanity and neohumanity in both novels, this 
scientific approach is combined with a New Age message, used in strategic advertising 
campaigns that portray being human as no more than another choice in the  catalogue 
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of choices by which neoliberalism encourages subjects to construct themselves. This 
dynamic is part of the transformation from ‘doing’ subject to ‘consuming’ subject 
(Rose, 1999: 231) which seeks to make the ‘engine of our desire’ the very engine of 
our being. In Houellebecq’s account, this is how we come to act on ourselves as we 
act on the world, with the same gap in self-conception that we seek to fill with stories 
to inoculate ourselves from the reality we have wrought. We construct a symbolic 
order that rationalises and obscures its impact on the real, whilst at the same time 
altering the very foundations of that reality.
The Shock of Shadowtime: Writing an Anthropocene  
Sensibility
In Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species (2016), Ursula 
Heise draws on Fredric Jameson’s theory of science fiction as a genre which allows the 
reader to historicise their immediate present, listing Houellebecq’s work (amongst 
that of others) as an example of the technique of employing the ‘future observer’, 
who renders this historicising possible. In Atomised, and even more directly in The 
Possibility of an Island, Houellebecq seeks to mediate the effects of the ‘future 
observer’ through his narratives of the present; once again, these aim to construct 
a way in which we may imagine a ‘world without us’. As Chakrabarty writes, ‘the 
 current crisis can precipitate a sense of the present that disconnects the future 
from the past by putting such a future beyond the grasp of historical sensibility’ 
(2009: 197). Rather than historicising our present, then, Houellebecq futurises it, 
 utilising the logic of shadowtime to destabilise the temporal space of his  narratives 
and  articulate the dual consciousness of the Anthropocene subject. This dual 
 consciousness is that articulated by Seymour, in her account of the absurdity of 
working as an  environmental educator in the face of immanent planetary decline. 
Shadowtime is understood as ‘the sense of living in two or more orders of  temporal 
scale simultaneously,’ as outlined by the ongoing Bureau of Linguistical Reality 
project, compiled by Heidi Quante and Alicia Escott. This experience of temporal 
disjuncture is, as yet, the best description of the way in which species awareness 
infiltrates individual consciousness, occurring as it does through the confrontation 
between human and deep history. 
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This concept of ‘futurising’ aims to make visible the increasing tendency of 
 literary fiction to blur the lines between realism and speculative writing. The rise 
of these ‘next five minutes’ narratives, to borrow a term from J. G. Ballard (1984), 
in literary fiction seems to me to give voice to the anthropogenic disjuncture that 
characterises life for the contemporary subject. Other categorisations are possible, of 
course – rather than futurised presents, for instance, we might see these as literary 
shadowtimes. Examples of these narratives are seen in the work of popular literary 
authors such as Dave Eggers (see Masterson, 2016); Jonathan Franzen – Freedom 
(2010) thematises overpopulation and extinction explicitly and extensively – and 
Jennifer Egan, whose 2010 novel A Visit From the Goon Squad employs  similar 
 destabilising of narrative conventions to The Possibility of an Island, and  gestures 
towards a future environment drastically different to our own.1 This is not a 
 comprehensive list or, as yet, a rigorously delineated genre, but is instead an  invitation 
to expand our reading so that we might begin to envision how Anthropocene 
sensibility is already at work in ways not yet remarked upon. 
The starting point for Houellebecq’s account of an emergent Anthropocene 
 sensibility is his thematic preoccupation with the way in which the ‘values’ of 
 individualism, competition and adaptation to chaos, which lie at the core of 
 neoliberalism (Sennett, 2006; Harvey, 2007) (mis)shape the private sphere. As the 
human subject is ‘corroded’ by these values, so too is the natural world, distorted and 
damaged through its recasting as natural capital. These values rely on a solipsistic 
understanding of the world, which is undermined by the experience of shadowtime, 
even as subjects struggle to articulate this experience.
Houellebecq offers a vision of negative potential, where the dismantling of those 
desires naturalised by capitalist systems and the subsequent cessation of produc-
tive action is depicted as the potential starting point for a generative relationship 
with the world beyond the Anthropocene. This account takes as its starting point 
 1 That these authors are all American reflects my own research background more than any definitive 
thesis.
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that which seems to be the only limit to capitalism – its unsustainable environmen-
tal impacts (as illustrated by Sachs, 2008). The environmental limits to capitalism 
make real the existential crises of capital. On these terms, Houellebecq offers us not a 
utopia, or even dystopia, but his best imagining of a human history of negation, cast 
on both an existential and environmental stage: an ‘atopia’, to borrow McKibben’s 
phrase (1990: 176). 
We might usefully seek to expand readings of atopia as a way to discuss 
 depictions of the future that seek to explore how we might imagine a world 
which is neither perfect nor terrible, but which instead envision what the world 
might look like without the primacy of human desire. McKibben suggests certain 
practical adjustments that might be necessary in order to realise an atopia, which 
include limiting human reproduction and resource consumption. Beyond this, he 
suggests, any number of cultures might still exist. This is somewhat optimistic, 
at least in the face of the account of the contemporary world Houellebecq offers. 
These practical adjustments would require a complete overturning of neoliberal 
logic, which relies on the right of the individual to assert their desire over all 
else. Houellebecq’s work makes the case for atopia in its exploration of desire as 
suffering, and its explicit connection between the form of this desire and the 
system that creates it. Suffering is a condition of human existence where all 
existence is denaturalised through its  recasting in market logic and where this 
denaturalisation is  simultaneously  re-naturalised through the presentation of this 
system of desires as inevitable and innately human. Through constructing narra-
tives in which the goal is not the  realisation of desire but the recognition of its 
inadequacy, Houellebecq’s work offers a literary groundwork for narratives of 
atopia.
Following from this, then, the concept of atopia is an effort to answer the 
 problematic of the Anthropocene imaginary, to ‘fill in’ the authenticity gap through 
constructing a speculative realm in which the ineluctable reality of planetary  crisis 
might be thought through, or even written out. It is this problematic imaginary 
that lies at the heart of Chakrabarty’s assertion that one never experiences being a 
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concept, and the tension he draws out with regard to constructing an understanding 
of our current crisis: 
The task of placing, historically, the crisis of climate change thus requires 
us to bring together intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension 
with each other: the planetary and the global; deep and recorded histories; 
 species thinking and critiques of capital. (2009: 213)
This difficulty is often expressed in the work of ecocritics; as Bruno Latour writes, 
‘The problem becomes for all of us in philosophy, science or literature, how do we 
tell such a story’ (2014: 3). For literature, this is a formal problem. Traditional  realist 
narratives rely on depiction of the human subject as the base model of experience. As 
such, even a novel with explicit environmental concerns, such as Franzen’s Freedom, 
tends to justify these concerns based on the pleasure derived from natural goods 
by the human subject. There is a move towards McKibben’s call to ‘believe in the 
rainforest for its own sake’ (1990: 160) but the realist novel cannot take the final 
imaginative leap because it remains, fundamentally, a story about people. As such, 
realist novels may dramatise the impasse between environmental concern and 
 individual desire, but cannot move beyond it, to imagining the possibility of 
 articulating distress on a species level. Latour and Chakrabarty suggest we have 
reached a stage where ‘bio’ is no longer enough, and must be replaced by ‘geo.’ For 
Chakrabarty (2009), this transition from ‘bio’ to ‘geo’ calls for a ‘scaling up’ of our 
imagination of the human to recognise the magnitude of our impact on the earth. 
For Latour, the result of this impact means we must explicitly recognise the earth as 
an agent of history; that is, not a passive site upon which humans stage history, but 
a body upon which other bodies act with material consequence (2014: 3). For 
 literature, then, the question is how we might come to reconcile this new reality – 
which is, undeniably, our reality – with the existent narrative models of realism in a 
way that allows us to think through the apparently unthinkable. 
I have previously pointed to the way in which Houellebecq’s neohuman  narrative 
connects his work to Alan Weisman’s endeavour in The World Without Us, and to 
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the difficulty in constructing a future imaginary that takes place at an apparently 
unimaginable level – if we cannot think of ourselves as species, how can we think of 
ourselves as extinct? Moreover, how can we think of a ‘world without us’ when the 
very definition of the world has, for most of human history, been our relationship to 
it? This is the bind that Houellebecq is negotiating, particularly in The Possibility of 
an Island, where his efforts to portray the Anthropocene subject go beyond 
 explorations of the neoliberal or late-capitalist subject usually read as the exemplary 
figure of his work. In her insightful study of Houellebecq, Carole Sweeney writes 
that ‘His fundamental concern is the encroachment of capitalism in its neoliberal 
 biopolitical form into all areas of affective human life’ (2013: ix). This reading is 
underpinned by an understanding of neoliberal subjectivity that rests on the logic 
of ‘no alternative,’ after Margaret Thatcher. That is, the horizons of possibility under 
the economised logic of neoliberal governmentality drastically limit the type of 
person one may (or should) imagine oneself to be, or seek to become. This is, 
 according to Sweeney, the cause of the affective distress experienced by Houellebecq’s 
characters, a state characterised by Mark Fisher as ‘captured discontent’ (2008: 80). 
We see this in Atomised, when Michel derides the ‘sex-and-shopping society we live 
in, where desire is marshalled and organised and blown up out of all proportion’ 
(Houellebecq, 2000: 192), and again in The Possibility of an Island, when Daniel1’s 
despair at being excluded from the neoliberal ‘sexual economy’ leads him to take 
his own life. ‘Affective distress’ here is a condition of hopelessness in the face of 
dehumanising logics of neoliberal selfhood, underlined by the experience of 
 powerlessness occasioned by existence in the contingent world. This is the ‘human 
experience,’ but it is not all of human experience. There is, quite literally, more to 
life than this. 
Chakrabarty describes the ecological conditions by which human life (both as 
we know it – which is to say, in terms of the historical account of human history – 
and at the condition of bare life) has become possible as ‘boundary parameters of 
human existence’ (2009: 218). These are, as mentioned above, the material limits to 
 capitalism, which make real its impact at a level beyond (bio)political conception. 
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This is the point at which The Possibility of an Island and, to a lesser extent, Atomised, 
intervene. By my reading, such an intervention is not a radical or unexpected move in 
Houellebecq’s fiction, but a ‘natural’ progression in his account of the Anthropocene 
subject (as natural as weather, anyway, as Fisher might have put it). That is, if his 
work seeks to take on the ‘human condition’ as we experience it in the contemporary 
moment, it does not do to give an account of homo economicus, or rather, of the 
distress of subjects who are interpellated to become homo economicus. The boundary 
parameters of human existence are the framework in which neoliberal capitalism 
operates – a system that perpetuates itself through its insistence on the impossibility 
of imagining any other way of life is rendered unsustainable through this very 
 insistence. The affective distress of the contemporary (Anthropocene) subject owes 
much to the material inequalities of neoliberal economics, but equally – and largely 
unspoken, or barely comprehended – to the precarity of our existence in the face of 
our environmental impact. This is the meaning of ‘shadowtime,’ the affective 
 experience of the disjuncture between ‘deep’ and ‘recorded’ history or, to put it more 
plainly, between the stories we tell to make sense of the world, and our experience 
of living in the world. What McKibben, Chakrabarty, Latour and other ecocritics 
are arguing is that the stories we construct have material weight in shaping how 
we live in and act on the world. It is also the reason I think we may more usefully 
refer to ‘futurised presents’ when trying to compile a critical language with which to 
unpick the myth of human exceptionalism that underlies our inability to conceive of 
ourselves at ‘species level’: this is an effort to escape the determinations of ‘history’ 
as ordering construct. 
Memory and Making Meaning
In both The Possibility of an Island and Atomised, Houellebecq frames a traditionally 
realist narrative of contemporary human experience within the dense scientific 
 language of speculative fiction, connecting the two with the intermediary  narrative 
of the neohumans. This is most extensively realised in The Possibility of an Island, 
in which the foundational narrative of Daniel1 is interwoven with those of his 
 neohuman successors. In both these novels, the transformation from human to 
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 neohuman is seen as part of a rational project of self-improvement. This recalls 
McKibben’s account of the end of nature through the imposition of a rational, 
 manmade ‘nature’ that sees ‘natural’ nature rationalised out of existence. Of this, 
McKibben says, ‘The loss of memory will be the eternal loss of meaning’ (1990: 197). 
It is this ‘loss of meaning’ that becomes increasingly central to the neohuman  narrators 
of The Possibility of an Island. In Atomised, the new species narrate  collectively, and 
seem entirely rational. Having overcome the degraded values of humanity, and free 
from personal vanity, their world seems perfect: as they say, ‘Men consider us happy’ 
(Houellebecq, 2000: 378). In contrast, at the end of The Possibility of an Island, 
Daniel25 says, ‘Happiness was not a possible horizon’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 423).
The neohumans of this latter novel are not the completely rational species of 
Atomised. Their liminality is the defining feature of their existence, as we saw earlier. 
Closely related to this liminality is the project of meaning-making to which their 
existence is tied: the reading of and commentary on their predecessor’s life  narrative. 
Neohuman lives are defined by the reading of these narratives. Although they can 
communicate with each other, these interactions are not frequent, nor are they 
particularly welcome when they do occur. This project literalises the idea that stories 
shape our world, as well as parodying our own efforts to construct historical  meaning 
through projecting our understanding. The central project of the neohumans is to 
revisit a past narrative they have no way of understanding. They have, apparently, 
neither ability nor inclination to ‘reenact’ it in their minds (see Chakrabarty, 2009: 
220). Despite this, as the novel progresses, Daniel1’s narrative exerts an ever-more 
irresistible influence on his successors. 
Daniel1’s life narrative is the exemplary life narrative: he was first to embark on 
the project, and it shaped the transformation from human to neohuman. Daniel1’s 
story is one of suffering, and of failed intimacy. Although he achieves success by 
 conventional capitalist measures – his career as a comedian is extremely lucrative – 
his efforts to find love are all in vain. He establishes a relationship of equals with 
Isabelle, a successful magazine editor, but this fails as she begins to age and his 
 sexual desire for her becomes inconstant. After this, he takes up with a much 
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younger woman, an actress called Esther. Although Daniel believes himself to be in 
love with Esther, their relationship is casual. In the end, she moves to America for the 
sake of her career; we discover from one of her neohuman successors that she never 
saw the relationship in quite the same light as Daniel. When relations begin to cool 
between Daniel and Esther, he understands it to be because of their considerable age 
difference – or, more exactly, because he is no longer young. The ostensible theme 
of Daniel1’s narrative is the unbearable suffering of aging in a youth-obsessed 
 consumer culture that attributes no value to the elderly. Daniel24 confirms this, in 
his account of the spectrum of life narratives: 
The number of human life stories is 6174, which corresponds to Kapreker’s 
first constant. Whether they come from men or women, from Europe or 
Asia, America or Africa, whether they are complete or not, all agree on one 
point: the unbearable nature of the mental suffering caused by old age. 
(Houellebecq, 2005: 74)
This suffering has, however, another dimension, revealed in Daniel1’s final entry to 
his life narrative: 
We are in September, the last holidaymakers are about to leave; with them 
the last breasts, the last bushes; the last accessible micro-worlds. An endless 
autumn awaits me, followed by a sidereal winter; and this time I really have 
finished my task. (Houellebecq, 2005: 373)
The consequence of aging is the foreclosure of generative futurity, the loss of access 
to ‘micro-worlds.’ This is not just a fear of death; it is a fear of negation of self through 
the impossibility of realising desire. 
In this same passage, Daniel1 asks what he has done to deserve such a fate, ‘And 
what had men, in general, done?’ He continues, ‘There is no longer any real world, 
no world, no human world, I am outside time’ (Houellebecq, 2005: 373). Daniel1 
 implicitly recognises the central problem of the Anthropocene subject: it is our 
desire that gives us futurity, and futurity that confers meaning on life. At the same 
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time, it is simply impossible that we continue to exert our desire, against the reality 
of global crisis change. Elsewhere, Daniel1 writes:
It is under the influence of an ancient animal sense of belonging that  people 
have so many conversations about meteorology and the climate, influenced 
by a primitive memory, inscribed in the sense organs, and linked to the 
 conditions of survival in the prehistoric era. These circumscribed, clichéd 
conversations are, however, the symptom of a real issue: even when we live 
in apartments, in conditions of thermal stability guaranteed by reliable and 
well-honed technology, it remains impossible for us to rid ourselves of this  
animal atavism; it is thus that a full awareness of our ignominy and 
 misfortune, and of their complete and definitive nature, can only manifest 
itself in sufficiently favourable climatic conditions. (Houellebecq, 2005: 364)
All life is suffering, perhaps, but the conditions for suffering, for living, are possible 
only given the correct parameter boundaries. The ‘complete and definitive’ account of 
our suffering must include the recognition that our desire disrupts these  boundaries; 
that our projects of meaning-making, as they are, undo the material circumstance 
in which any meaning may be made. It is this stasis of meaning that underpins 
 neohuman existence in The Possibility of an Island – not a loss, but a stalling, an 
impasse. For Latour, this epitomises our contemporary problem: ‘through a  surprising 
inversion of background and foreground, it is human history that has become frozen 
and natural history that is taking on a frenetic pace’ (2014: 13). Human history as a 
concept is stagnant in The Possibility of an Island, circumscribed by a finite number 
of life stories, all of which apparently say the same thing: how terrible it is, to be the 
cause of one’s own ruin. 
This suffering is summed up in the conclusion of Daniel1’s life story, to which 
his predecessors do not have direct access. Daniel25 learns the truth of his original’s 
demise from Esther31, who shares the information only reluctantly, at Daniel25’s 
insistence that he must hear it in order to understand his predecessor. In the end, 
Daniel1 wrote a series of desperate letters to Esther1, culminating in his suicide. 
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His last letter ended with a poem, and we learn that it is the final verse of this poem 
that caused neohuman Marie23 to abandon her life in the compound and re-enter 
the world, in search of some new common society not predicated on individual 
 separation. This last verse runs as follows: 
And love, where all is easy,
Where all is given in the instant;
There exists in the midst of times
The possibility of an island. (Houellebecq, 2005: 378)
The possibility of an island, as Marie23 understands it, refers to a radical sense of 
 connection between people, now absent from neohuman life. The neohumans 
no longer reproduce biologically and are supposed to be free from desire because 
they are free of futurity; their ‘immortality’ renders them atemporal. The  impetus 
to impose oneself on the world through procreation has been replaced by the 
direct genetic reproduction of the self. Despite this, as we have seen, they have not 
managed to liberate themselves entirely. Their propensity to enact an  overcoming 
of self is limited by their nostalgia for desire, and their inability to escape their 
 individualism. 
Daniel1’s poem has the same impact on Daniel25 as it did on Marie23, and he 
too leaves his compound and sets off into the world. He is not sure what he is looking 
for, and suffers many tribulations. At the end of his journey, however, he encounters 
the sea, which he had previously thought vanished:
So this was what men had called the sea, what they had considered as the 
great consoler, the great destroyer as well, the one that erodes, that  gently 
puts an end to things. I was impressed, and the last elements  missing 
from my comprehension of the species fell finally into place. I understood 
better, now, how the idea of the infinite had been able to germinate in 
the brains of these primates; the idea of an infinity that was accessible 
through slow transitions that had their origins in the finite; I understood, 
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also, how a first theory of love had been able to form in the brain of Plato. 
(Houellebecq, 2005: 421)
Daniel25’s reaction to the sea recasts the ‘possibility of an island’ and draws on the 
Platonic theory of love that recognises love as a force of union not with another 
being, but with the world itself (Levy, 1979). Think of the island of Lanzarote, so 
often the subject of Houellebecq’s work. A volcanic mass in the middle of the ocean, 
it seems as though it should be barren. In fact, it has a lush and distinctive ecosystem, 
a ‘micro-world’ of its own, and is still part of a global environmental order. Overcom-
ing the suffering of separation, for Houellebecq, requires a radical refiguring of our 
place in the world. We see this, too, in Atomised, where Michel Djerinski is similarly 
captivated by the sea:
Many witnesses attest to his fascination with this distant edge of the Western 
world, constantly bathed in a soft shifting light, where he had come so often, 
where, as he wrote in one of his last notes ‘the sky, the sea, the light con-
verge’. We now believe Michel Djerzinski went into the sea. (Houellebecq, 
2000: 365)
Like the mouse Reepicheep in C. S. Lewis’s The Voyage of the Dawn Treader (1952), 
Djerzinski steps off the edge of the world. Where Reepicheep sought Aslan’s 
country – Lewis’s stand in for Christian heaven – Djerzinski seeks the negation of 
human existence: union with the sky, the sea, the light – the world. The possibility 
of an island is the possibility of overcoming human desire in order to find a way in 
which we might establish a positive generative relationship with the world beyond 
ourselves. McKibben writes:
I tried to pick out the few constellations I could identify – Orion’s Belt, the 
Dippers. The ancients, surrounded by wild and even hostile nature, took 
comfort in seeing the familiar above them – spoons and swords and nets. 
But we will need to train ourselves not to see these patterns. The comfort we 
need is inhuman. (1990: 200) 
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Houellebecq’s work parodies the impasse of our ‘authenticity gap’, and follows the 
neoliberal rhetoric of choice to its illogical extreme. This is Bartleby’s famous 
 negation, “I would prefer not to” (Melville, 1856), re-inscribed at the level of DNA. 
Humanity, in Houellebecq’s account, would prefer not to – not to think, not to 
 transform, not to act on the world any more, when all action imperils a future that 
is less and less far away. Why change yourself, when you could change your species? 
After all, all we have to lose is our nature – unless we too can come to understand 
the possibility of an island.
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